Jianzhi Wu

PLS 328 – California Politics

June 8, 2000

 

Abstract

 

On June 2, 1998, a great travesty occurred. California voters passed Proposition 227, which severely restricted the use of primary language for instructing English learners, and instead called for a transitional program of “structured English immersion” that was not normally last more than one year. It was unfortunate for the country because we allowed ill-informed politicians and xenophobic voters and a lot of misled minorities to dictate educational policy. The scientific and educational bilingual issue was unfortunately politicized by politician Ron Unz—a computer software businessman without any teaching experience. But bilingual education is not a recent phenomenon in this country. Its history in the U.S. falls into two distinct period: the first being from 1840 to 1920 and the second beginning in the early 1960s. Through out the whole initiative process, we can see that campaign strategies, mass media’s bias, money spent in the campaign all have influence on voters. Proposition 227 passed with big margin 61 to 39 percent and became the law. However, the conflict still exists, the demand for bilingual education is still growing. The fast growing Latino population is soon becoming minority-majority. The new model of one-year sheltered English immersion program is untested and unproved. The future for the California’s students remains unclear. This raised a question that is there a backlash on Proposition 227 in the future? People may fine clues from the demographic projection for the Latino students who will be enrolled in California’s public schools. Who are losers in long run? It may be our your children—the country’s future.

 

 

 

Politics and campaign behind Proposition 227

 

Introduction

 

The original 1849 Constitution was clear: “All laws, decrees, regulations, and provisions, which, from their nature, require publication, shall be published in English and Spanish.”[1] The constitution itself was handwritten in both languages, reflecting California’s two dominant cultures. Possibly due to the influx of Euro-Americans during the Gold Rush, that bilingual requirement was eliminated in the 1879 constitution. California has struggled with this issue ever since. In the 19th century, the teaching of German in the public schools of America was the most visible example of bilingualism in education. By the 1920, German language classes were virtually extinct because of, among other factors, a backlash following World War I. In 1923, the United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional those state laws that prohibited German language instruction in private schools. From the 1920s until the 1960 and 1970, when the Hispanic population in this country had escalated, there was little action regarding bilingualism in America’s school. In 1974, the United States Supreme Court issued a ruling that Title VI of the 1964 Civil Right Act mandated that the City of San Francisco provide special instruction for approximately 1800 non-English speaking Chinese students (Lau V. Nichols). Following this decision, the federal government issued Lau guidelines that seemed to move the public schools of America toward bilingual status. By the late 1970s, however, and continuing through the 1980s, numerous political and educational debates had called into question the effectiveness of bilingual programs. California’s bi-culture was rapidly becoming bipolar (two cultures in conflict and/or poles apart). In some communities, the influx of immigrants from Asia and elsewhere suggested a multi-polar state. Many white Californians were increasingly uncomfortable with the pluralism around them and the bilingual policies that resulted. In 1986, voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 63, which declared English as the official language of the state. Its purpose was to “preserve, protect and strengthen the English language.”[2] In 1998, they also rejected bilingual education in the public schools by approving Proposition 227. The long-term impact of these measures remains unclear but they do reflect discomfort with hyper-pluralism in the Golden State—an attitude which tells newcomers: “If you want to live and learn in the Golden State, speak English—our language.” (David G. Lawrence, 1999).

            This paper has two purposes. Fist, to identify the politics and political conflict associated with the issue such as who is involved, and what are what are the points for and against Proposition 227. Second purpose is to analyze political mechanism and campaign strategies involved in passing Proposition 227 in term of who stands to benefit and who stands to lose.

 

Historical Background—political and political conflict with Bilingual Education

 

            Bilingual education programs were mandated under California state law in 1976 and the number of students enrolled in these programs has grown dramatically from year to year. The 1992 official California Department of Education census showed a total of 1,078,705 limited-English students in the state’s school and, based on the rate of past growth, this figure approaches 1,442,692 in 1999,[3] or nearly one in four school children. Nationally, California far outranks all other states in the number of LEP children. Almost half of all limited-English students in the country are enrolled in California schools, and they represent more than 150 different language backgrounds. California was one of the first states in the nation to enact a comprehensive bilingual education bill. The Chacon-Moscone Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act of 1976 followed on the heels of the historic Lau vs. Niochols Supreme Court decision requiring that schools take affirmative steps to ensure that English learners had access to the standard curriculum. The impetus for California’s legislation was the observation that limited English proficient students do “not have the English language skills necessary to benefit from instruction only in English at a level substantially equivalent to pupils whose primary language is English.” Thus, “The legislature…declared that the primary goal of all programs under this article was, as effectively and efficiently as possible, to develop in each child fluency in English” (California Education Code, 1976, Section 52161), while at the same time ensuring that they had access to the core curriculum. The preferred means for doing so was through early use of primary language. However, in spite of legislation that mandated bilingual education, the policy was never without controversy, and over the years there were numerous attempts to modify the law and abandon the practice of primary language instruction. In part because of this controversy, no policy was ever adopted to provide certified bilingual teachers for all English learners. Thus, while the Commission on Teacher Credentialing offered the Bilingual Cross-cultural, language and Academic Development (BCLAD) credential, by 1979, only one-third of English learners in California were actually in classrooms taught by teachers with bilingual certification. The remaining two-thirds of these students were assigned to some other kind of program, or to no special program at all and often were taught by teachers with no special training to teach English learners.[4] Controversy over native-language education was at boil in California. In 1987, the California legislature failed to reauthorize the Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act, allowing it to expire. It was in this context that Proposition 227 came onto the California political scene. Proponents of Proposition 227 contended that bilingual education had failed as a pedagogical strategy and should be abandoned.

 

Who is involved?

 

Ron Unz, 39 then, a wealthy multimillionaire Silicon Valley computer software businessman and a single man with no kids of his own wrote the initiative know as “English for the Children” and seized enough signatures from Californians and put it on the 1998 ballot to eliminate bilingual education and all other English language development programs that use primary language to ensure access to academic courses such as math, science, and civics.[5] He had contributed substantial amounts of his private funds to the campaign and had formed One Nation/One California to run the campaign. He has no background whatsoever in education generally or in the education of English learners. He ran for governor in the Republican primary in 1994 and lost to Governor Peter Wilson. He has enlisted the support of individuals associated with the English Only movement, such as English immersion teacher and former U.
S. English board member Gloria Matta Tuchman. The group’s initial financial disclosure statement reveals significant initial out-of-state support for this California initiative: about 1/3 of the total funding has come from 2 donors in Florida, and another 1/3 from Unz himself---1.2 million—more than half of it his own money—to pass a ballot initiative that would all but abolish bilingual education in California.[6]

            Those that against the passage of Proposition 227 are The California Teacher’s Association (CTA), California Teachers of English as a Second or Other Language (CATESOL), California School Board’s Association (CSBA), Association of California School Administrators (ACSA), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and Los Angeles Unified School District and some other school districts, National Association for Bilingual Education (NABE), A. Jerrold Perenchio, CEO of Univison, the nation’s largest Spanish-language network, and the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda (NHLA), California Association for Bilingual Education (CABE).

 

Argument in Favor of Proposition 227

 

Why do we need to change California’s Bilingual Education system?

 

Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 227

 

            Several years ago, the 1970’s law mandating bilingual education in California expired. Since then local school districts—principals, parents and teachers—have been developing and using different programs to teach children English.

            Many of the older bilingual education programs continues to have great success. In other communities some schools are succeeding with English immersion and others with dual language immersion programs. Teaching children English is the primary goal, no matter what teaching method they are using.

            Proposition 227 outlaws all of these programs—even the best ones—and mandates a program that has never been tested anywhere in California! And if it doesn’t work, we are stuck with it any way.

            Proposition 227 proposes

Proposition 227 funding comes from three wealthy men…one from New York, one from Florida, and one from California.

            The New York man has given Newt Gingrich $310,000! The Florida man who put up $45,000 for Proposition 227 is part of a fringe group that believe “government has no role in financing, operating, or defining schooling, or even compelling attendance.” These are not people who should dictate a single teaching method for California’s schools. If the law allows different methods, we can use what works.[8]

 

Passing Proposition 227

 

            Ron Unz filed the English-only education initiative (the “Unz initiative”) with the California Attorney General’s Office on May 9, 1997. On June 26, 1997, the Attorney General’s Office issued a proposed title and summary, permitting the proponents to begin collecting signatures to qualify the initiative for the June 1998 ballot. On June 2, 1998, California voters resoundingly passed Proposition 227 by 61-39%, requiring all students in California’s public schools to be taught academic subjects in English. Effectively dismantling the bilingual education system that had been in effect for the previous twenty years, the new law mandates that instructors at public schools teach all subjects to non-English speaking children in “sheltered English immersion” programs. The day after California voters passed Proposition 227, public interest attorneys filed a class action suit against Governor Pete Wilson, the State Board of Education and its members, and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction Delain Eastin, on behalf of 1.4 million students classified as “Limited English Proficient” (LEP), alleging that the new law violated their rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Education Opportunities Act (EEOA).

 

What we learned from the politics behind “English for the Children” initiative

 

            By closely reviewing the whole process of campaign fro and against Proposition 227, we came to understand why one side won, while the other side lost. Someone attributed the victory to the smart strategies used by Yes on 227 campaigns, while others attributed its victory primarily to mistakes by the No on 227 campaigns.

            Strategies used by Yes on Proposition 227

            First, on Unz entitled Proposition 227 English for the Children, a brilliant stroke of packaging. Here was a goal that no one could dispute. Who wanted to vote against English, or against children? The label also established a false choice in voters’ minds: either teach students the language of the country or give them bilingual education. Perhaps most important, it focused debate on practical issues of educational effectiveness, avoiding the inflammatory symbolism of earlier English-only campaigns and thereby broadening the initiative’s appeal. Unlike previous English-only advocates, Unz made special efforts to “decouple” opposition to bilingual education from “anti-immigrant and anti-Latino views”. He filled campaign posts with Latinos and Asians, including Jaime Escalante, the legendary math teacher of Stand and Deliver fame, and Gloria Matta Tuchman, a first-grade teacher and candidate for state superintendent of public instruction. Rather than attacking immigrants for speaking other languages, Unz campaigned in their communities for children’s “right” to learn English. In short, he posed as their advocate against unresponsive schools.

            Second, political science theory tells us that the mass media, whatever their disclaimers, are not simply a mirror held up to reality or messenger that carries the news. There is inevitably a process of selection, of editing, and of emphasis, and this process reflects, to some degree, the way in which the media are organized, the kinds of audiences they seek to serve, and the preference and opinions of the members of the media. Unz’s attack strategy proved appealing to the news media, which gave massive coverage to Proposition 227 as compared with other ballot initiatives and primary races. More than 600 newspaper articles (not to mention countless radio and television broadcasts) appeared on the anti-bilingual initiative in the six months before Election Day.[9] Most of these reports featured inflammatory charges by Ron Unz, rarely accompanied by effective counter-arguments. By and large, the press defined the debates as Unz did: not “How can programs for English learners be improved?” or “Do school districts need greater flexibility in teaching these students?” but “Should bilingual education be eliminated in favor of intensive English instruction?” This way of framing the issue—as a misleading either/or decision—clearly benefited the Yes on 227 campaigns. Moreover, it cast opponents in an unfamiliar and uncomfortable role: defenders of the status quo. Media bias is a complex phenomenon-reflecting various external influences, internal working of the “news business,” and the culture of journalism. All of these sources contributed to the distorted and unbalanced coverage of Proposition 227.

            Third, in order to indict the “current system,” Unz seized a misleading figure from the California Department of Education. Since the early 1990s, about 5 to 7 percent of LEP students had been “re-designated” as fluent in English each year. He dubbed this the 95 percent annual failure rate”—a memorable sound—bite that was circulated widely by journalists. Seldom was it noted that, owing to an estimated shortage of 27,000 bilingual teachers, less than 30 percent of California’s English learners were enrolled in bilingual classrooms and only 20 percent were taught by fully certified instructions.[10] If programs were indeed “failing,” it was more logical to blame English-only methodologies. Nor did the news media ask many questions about Unz’s one-year standard for English acquisition, despite its lack of scientific support. The pros and cons of bilingual education—not of the initiative itself—commanded center stage throughout the campaign. Because Unz avoided nativist appeals and targeted pedagogical issues, few commentators saw the initiative as an attack on ethnic minorities. Rather, they portrayed it as a choice between a “depressing status quo,” “the dismal experiment known as bilingual education,” and “a meat-ax, ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to a complicated issue,” “a blunt instrument” requiring schools to stress English. Most voters opted for the latter. (James Crawford, 1999)

            Fourth, for Ron Unz, the assault on bilingual education served a broader, neoconservative agenda. He argued, “most Hispanics are classic blue-collar Reagan Democrats” whose views on social issues like abortion draw then toward conservatism, while Asians are a privileged stratum “much like Jews…but without the liberal guilt.” He portrayed both groups as “natural constituencies” for Republicans. Thus the party should seek “to unite rather than divide conservative natives and immigrants” by stressing “core policies” such as free markets and limited government. Conversely, it should oppose “divisive” programs like affirmative action and bilingual education in the name of “individual liberty, community spirit, and personal self-reliance.” In other words, conservatives should be both “pro-immigrant” and pro-assimilation. Ron Unz “recognized that in many respects the political climate was extraordinarily inopportune for such an effort (Ending what he called “this failed and legally dubious program-bilingual education). The ethnic wounds inflicted by 187 had been reopened by the destructive handling of 209, and for a Republican like myself to jump in with a proposal to dismantle the bilingual cornerstone of Latino public education was to risk a terrible explosion. In order to mitigate the risk, it was absolutely crucial that the ballot measure be properly perceived as being both pro-immigrant and politically nonpartisan.”[11] Unz’s initiative provided the first test of his ideas for conservative coalition building: Could the fears of English speakers be assuaged without alienating too many minorities? Was opportunity-through-assimilation an idea that could be sold to immigrants and natives alike? Would it be credible to attack bilingual education on behalf of those it was designed to benefit? The results were missed. Unz fell far short of the 80 to 90 percent support among Latinos that he predicted at the outset of his campaign; in the June primary they opposed the initiative by nearly 2 to 1 (Los Angeles Time—CNN Poll, 1998). His dream of a political realignment in California looked even more outlandish, as ethnic minorities turned out in record numbers to back Democratic candidates in November 1998. Clearly, immigrants and their descendants continued associate the Republican Party with the nativist elements it had courted in recent years. Nevertheless, judging by the vote on Proposition 227, Unz’s short-term strategy had a wide appeal among Californians. The initiative passed easily, despite a disproportionate turnout of liberal and Democratic voters, who defeated other conservative ballot measures.[12] Ethnic opposition was considerable weaker than it had been over Proposition 187 four year earlier: 37 percent of Latinos and 57 percent of Asians voted for the anti-bilingual initiative (Los Angeles Times CNN Poll, 1998),[13] versus 23 percent of Latinos and 47 percent of Asians for the anti-immigrant initiative (Los Angeles Times Poll, 1994). In other words, attacking bilingual education did not result in the polarization than many had expected. Evidence is fragmentary on which language-minority voters supported Proposition 227 and why. Opinion polls indicate, however, that its popularity among all voters was closely correlated with economic status. Respondents with annual household incomes over $60,000 were more than twice as likely to oppose bilingual education as those with incomes below $20,000. Among Latinos, the vote was close in middle-class Huntington Park. A poll of Chinese Americans in San Francisco-a less affluent Asian community, where most respondents preferred to be surveyed in Cantonese or Mandarin-found that 73 percent planned to vote no. Thus the available data suggest that recent immigrants with children in bilingual education were far more likely to oppose Proposition 227. It appears that Unz’s arguments had more resonance for higher-income, English-proficient Asians and Latinos. For many, class tended to take precedence over ethnicity as a prism for viewing the issue. Having limited contact with current programs for English learners, they formed opinions largely on the basis of media accounts. In short, they seemed to approach Proposition 227 not very differently from affluent Anglos. And they rendered the same verdict on bilingual education: guilty as charged. The outcome might have been different however, if the program’s advocates had mounted a defense.

            Mistakes by the No on Proposition 227

            Unz effetely used his strategies to campaign for Proposition 227. However, people against Proposition 227 made some mistakes. As Jim Shultz (1998), director of the Democracy Center in San Francisco, pointed out mistakes by the No on 227 campaign as follows:

By the time the initiative’s opponents got organized in November 1997, they were trailing by more than 4 to 1 among registered voters (Los Angeles Times Poll, 1997). Ron Unz had been circulating ballot petitions for more than four months, receiving extensive media coverage and encountering no organized response from the advocates of bilingual education. Failing to answer such attacks was hardly a new phenomenon; nor was it limited to California. Years of inattention to the program’s public image had left numerous mis-concepts unchallenged. Journalists, echoing the conventional wisdom, were skeptical of research findings favorable to bilingual pedagogies. Opinion surveys usually found that the idea of intensive English instruction was popular in immigrant communities. Latino politicians, impressed by the early polls on Proposition 227, wee reluctant to speak out against it. Meanwhile, other democrats expressed impatience with the California Association for Bilingual Education for opposing compromise legislation; too, remained largely silent about the initiative. Isolated and misunderstood, bilingual educators reached out to allies in California’s education, civil rights, and immigrant advocacy communities, who recognized the extreme nature of Unz’s proposal. These forces came together to form Citizens for an Educated America, the official No on 227 organizations. Within initial funding from the California Association for Bilingual Education (CABE) and the California Teachers Association (CTA), they conducted polls and focus groups while seeking professional advice from political and media consultants. For No on 227, the immediate task was developing a strategy for the underdog campaign. Based on their analysis of the electorate, the consultants offered the following recommendation:

·      In a state of 33 million people, reaching the electorate would mean relying heavily on broadcast media. Because of the expense of advertising-more than $ million a week to saturate the major television markets fundraising would have to be a high priority for the No on 227 campaigns.

·      Traditional supporters of bilingual education-language minorities and progressives—were unlikely to turn out in large enough numbers to defeat Proposition 227 campaigns.

·      Traditional supporters of bilingual education-language minorities and progressive-were unlikely to turn out in large enough numbers to defeat Proposition 227. It would also be necessary to win over “swing voters” yet to form a strong opinion. Of these, the most promising demographic sector was determined to be “Republican women over 50.”

·      A winning message should highlight the initiative’s extreme provisions, rather than challenge the conventional wisdom about the “failure” of bilingual education. Opinion research suggested that, while Unz’s solution could be discredited, there was too little time to change voters’ minds about the problem. In short, the consultants advised: “DO NOT get into a discussion defending bilingual education” (Citizens for an Educated America, 1998a; emphasis in original).

This last recommendation came as a shock to many bilingual educators and researchers. How could they fail to respond to falsehoods about their profession or stand by silently while ideologues maligned programs that benefited LEP children? Some advocates viewed the Proposition 227 debates, as an excellent opportunity to educate the public about second-language acquisition. They also worried that refusing to challenge Unz’s charges would be seen as conceding their validity. Ultimately, however, the leaders of Citizens and its organizational sponsors accepted the consultants’ advice.[14] They came to believe that not discussing bilingual education offered the best hope of saving it. The “Don’t Defend” strategy was then sold to CABE members and to bilingual directors throughout the state, who were counseled not to respond to attacks on their programs. Activists, including those wording in language-minority communities were urged to highlight what was wrong with Proposition 227, not what was right with bilingual education. “Put aside your personal feelings,” they were told, in effect. “Trust the professionals to run this campaign.” Many advocates did so: others worded independently of Citizens. Grassroots efforts sprouted throughout the state, but they received limited support or coordination from the campaign apparatus, except for those that involved fundraising.

To represent its views, No on 227 hired spokespersons with no background in bilingual education. Whenever the subject came up in public debates or media interviews, they sought to redirect the discussion, saying “Bilingual education is not no the ballot in June. What is on the ballot is Ron Unz’s very specific proposal for California’s school children…I’ll be happy to discuss the merits of different bilingual education programs on June 3 (the day after the election) assuming the Ron Unz Initiative fails and we can still have a meaningful conversation” [15]

Based on its private polling, Citizens singled out various features of Proposition 227 for criticism. Initially, it stressed provisions that allowed children to be mixed by age and grade for English instruction; that restricted special help to 180 days; and that made teachers vulnerable to lawsuits and personal financial penalties for violating the English-only mandate. None of these issues seemed to capture the public’s attention. So, in the campaign’s late stages, a new target was selected, the initiative’s $50 million annual appropriation to teach English to adults who would agree to tutor children in the language. Clearly, Unz had inserted his provision to bolster his “pro-immigrant” image; it was hardly the most promising way to serve LEP students. Nevertheless, it resembled the federal family English Literacy program, which bilingual educators had long supported. The proposed funding was relatively modest about one-sixth of one percent of California’s education budget and it addressed a real need. Citizens determined, however, that diverting funds from K-12 schools to benefit adult immigrants was unpopular with many Californians. So attacking the idea became the centerpiece of its multi-million-dollar advertising blitz. This position required an about-face for the coalition opposing Unz. Over the past decade, several of its members had lobbied to remedy the chronic shortage of adult English classes, exposing the hypocrisy of English-only advocates who declined to support additional funding. Now it was the No on 227 campaigns that appeared hypocritical. Unz seized upon the issue, accusing his opponents of betraying their own principles out of desperation.

Meanwhile, the news media did not stop reporting on the charges against bilingual education-only effective responses to those charges. Some journalists did seek to balance their accounts with the opinions of bilingual educators and researchers who acted independently of the No campaign. Parents and teachers sought to publicize local success stories for bilingual education-two-way, or dual immersion, programs in particular. Local organizers rallied supporters though demonstrations and candlelight marches. Yet these individual advocates spoke with many voices, delivering divers messages. They had little success in discrediting the claims of Ron Unz and his allies, whom continued to dominate the news.

Citizens had limited success in focusing attention on the initiative itself, or in generating media coverage of any kind. Its attack on the $50 million adult English provisions never became a central issue for voters for Californians who were skeptical about bilingual education to oppose Proposition 227 notably, its severe restrictions on parental choice and local control in educating English learners.

Yet No on 227 never stressed these features of the initiative, which in a different kind of campaign might have decisive. No matter that Citizens outspent English for the Children by nearly 5 to 1.[16] Yes on 227 had no need to run television ads because it received such favorable “free media” attention.

Naturally Unz cited the “Don’t Defend” strategy as evidence that bilingual education was indefensible. It is hard to fault most Californians for believing him, because few heard the other side. No on 227 began with the premise that voters’ minds were closed to considering the merits of bilingual programs. So, rather than engage them in discussion on the issue, the campaign sought to distract them with diversionary gimmicks. Instead of appealing to their sense of fairness, it pandered to their nativism and parsimony. When the strategy failed, many bilingual education advocates concluded the electorate was so bigoted that their cause had been hopeless from the start. With its defeatist approach, however, Citizens failed to put this hypothesis to any logical test. Whether Californians could have been convinced to support bilingual education or at least resolve to “mend it, don’t end it” is impossible to say. No on 227 never tried. (James Crawford, 1999)

 

Impact in terms of who stands to benefit and who stands to lose

 

            Approximately one-third of certified bilingual teachers who served in bilingual classrooms prior to 227 were no longer doing so in the period following the passage of the initiative. The impact of the dramatic shift in policy on these teachers and what the ongoing effects on the training and recruitment of teachers to serve English learners are clear. For teachers who had trained as bilingual teachers, devoting the extra time and resources to acquire this credential, the impact was significant. Many teachers also expressed the concern that they could be held legally liable for failing to implement the law correctly, and they worried that they would lose their jobs, or worse. Again, teachers with a high percentage of Spanish speaking parents also noted that parents wee confused by the law and felt awkward in addressing the teachers. They new policy would discourage parents from coming to school and harm parent-teacher relations.

            The impact on teacher recruitment is that there would be less of an emphasis on seeking bilingual teachers as a result of the passage of Proposition 227.

            The impact on training is also obvious. Prior to the passage of Proposition 227, and in good part bought about by the class size reduction initiatives, different students in California noted major inequities in the access to credentialed teachers. English learners were then, and are now, the most likely to be taught by a teacher without any credential. Given the major changes in curriculum and teaching methods that have been mandated, much is being demanded of teachers of English learners, many of whom are inadequately prepared to begin with. See Figure 1.

            Who then stands to benefit? Those people who felt unease about minority culture and languages other than English around them are the winners. As Ron Unz pointed out: “The irrationality of official statistics did not prevent Californians of European ancestry from recognizing that they were fast becoming a minority within their own state and their unease about this situation would soon be reflected in the political landscape.”[17]

 

Current legislation/policy to mitigate the problem or resolve the conflict

 

            Even though proposition 227 had passed there is still conflict associated with it, and several different things have been done to try to resolve the conflict. One of the things that have been done is that some schools have tried duel-language programs. These programs are also called two-way of bilingual immersion programs. In these programs native English-speaking students are put into the same classroom with students who are trying to learn English and instruction is alternated between languages, usually Spanish and English. Along with the duel-language programs some bills have been sponsored that would give parents more of a say as to weather their children remain in bilingual programs. Also, these bills would give the school and the states more responsibility.

            According to Proposition 227 parents can get a waiver, and this would allow their child to return to bilingual classes if the parents think it is best. However, the child must have been in regular English classes for at least 30 days before a waiver can be obtained. Another way that a waiver can be obtained is if the child is 10 years or older, and it is the informed belief of the school principal and educational staff that an alternate course of educational study would be better suited for the child’s rapid acquisition of basic English language skills. In some cases, parents have been discouraged from obtaining a waiver. In one case more than 50 parents contacted groups such as On Campus and the Civil Rights in Public Education Network to say that they had requested a waivers varies from school and school and district to district. In 1997 one school in Los Angeles Unified school district had more than 107,000 children enrolled in bilingual classes. However, in October of 1998 only 12,000 waivers had been requested. In some school districts the number of students in bilingual programs has actually gone up. In the San Francisco district the percentage of students went up from 40 to 46 percent. Proposition 227 became the law because people felt that bilingual education was not working and something needed to be done about the situation. However, the way the proposition is worded is vague in some places and because of this there have been different interpretations of the proposition. For example, the proposition says that students will be taught “overwhelmingly” in English, but it is difficult to know what “overwhelmingly” means. Within the Los Angeles Unified School District some children in English-immersion classes might hear Spanish only 10 percent of time while children in other school might hear Spanish 30 percent of time. In Gilroy, California school officials have decided that “overwhelmingly” means 60 percent English and 40 percent Spanish, and in San Diego “overwhelmingly” has interpreted to mean 70 to 30 breakdown between English and Spanish. There are some schools that have chosen to keep their bilingual programs and just call them English-immersion and keep doing things the way they were done before. This has brought about threats o lawsuits from Ron Unz. According to Unz, “The measure has very sharp teeth, any administrator who personally violates it can be sued and held personally liable…” there is still some confusion about the Proposition 227 and it is difficult as of yet to tell it the proposition will be effective.

 

Recommendation

 

            Political theory tells us that difference among people is the source of conflict. In a democratic society, this difference is solved by majority vote. In California, cultural and language wars has never stopped. Does the victory of the Proposition 227 end the wars? The answer is no. Then how we can mitigate the problem? The solution should follow the unbiased analysis.

            Why the victory of the Proposition 227 didn’t end the wars? We can find clues from the demography census. Census projections show that Hispanics will surpass blacks as the biggest American minority group by 2005, and will form fully one-fifth of the U.S. population by 2035. In California, census shows that by July 1998, Hispanic population accounts 30 percent of the state’s total population. The number is still growing. The projected size for 2010 is 37.8 percent. Marketers have discoverd their $500 billion purchasing power—up 67 percent per cent since 1990. Major corporations are pouring money into advertising campaigns aimed at Latinos, fuelling a growth in Hispanic advertising agencies (there are now 160, up from half a dozen in 1980). New magazines are popping up—such as People en Espanal and Latina, a glossy quarterly aimed at young Hispanic woman. All across Los Angeles, billboards proclaim that the city’s No. 1 TV station for news in Spanish-language KMEX—flagship of the national Univison network. Los Angeles County, 80 percent white as recently as the late 1960s, now has no ethnic majority. Hispanics have long spilled out of traditional barrios like East Los Angeles where English signs are almost as rare as in east end Montreal and billboards for Maxwell House coffee read “Bueno hasta la ultima gota” (Good to the last drop) (Andrew Philips, 1998). Projection for California K-12 Enrollment by Major Ethnic and Linguistic Minority Group shows that Latino students will become the majority. (See Figure 2) If the demand for bilingual education grows, combined with correct campaign strategy, there could be another backlash on the Proposition 227.

What is to be done? Our recommendation is as follows:

·      To depoliticize the discussion of how to serve English learners.

·      To influence decisions that are crucial to language-minority students, educators must learn to participate more effectively in the policy debate: not by distorting the research evidence or by denouncing their opponents as racists, but be explaining bilingual pedagogies in a credible way-that is, in a political context that members of the public can understand and endorse.

·      To inform the public and parents what’s going on in school.

 

Conclusion

 

            California has its Spanish root and culture. The California’s Constitution was written both in Spanish and English at its beginning in 1848. It also required “All laws, decrees, regulations, and provisions which, from their nature, require publication, shall be published in English and Spanish.” It was only with the influx of Euro-Americans, especially Anglo-American during the Gold Rush, that the bilingual requirement was eliminated in the 1879 constitution. English then dominated California. California has struggled with bilingual issue since then. When Hispanic and other minority in California have grown so rapidly in recent years that white English-speaking Californians felt that they soon become majority minority. Proposition 227 was one effort that they tried to ensure English and Anglo culture. The successful strategies of Unz and Yes on 227 ensured the passage of Proposition 227. Mistakes made by No on 227 let us realized that politics of direct democracy is both a high cost “art” and a gable. Big money doesn’t necessary ensure the winning. As we can se in the passage of Proposition 227, No on 227 spent much more money (more than 4 to 1) than Yes on 227, but they lost the battle. Is it the new model really better or effective than the old bilingual education model? No statistical data that would shed light on the effectiveness of one-year sheltered English program proposed by Ron Unz in Proposition 227. The real impact on California students remains unclear. The bilingual education is educational and scientific issue in essence. Unfortunately it was made a political issue by the politicians. Proposition 227 has become the law, but it doesn’t solve the problem. The conflict is still there and the demand for bilingual education is also there. Educators and parents are still using loopholes of Proposition 227 to get the bilingual education. With the rapid increase of Latino population, will there be a backlash on Proposition 227 in the future? Who knows?

 

 

Bibliography

 

 

Ron Unz, California and the End of White America, Commentary 108 no4 17-28 n 1999.

Russell W. Rumberger, 1998-99 Annual Report, University of California Linguistic Minority Research Institute, October 1999

Max A. Bailey, Bilingual Education: Legal Perspectives and Policy Considerations, Illinois School Journal v72, n2, pp15-21, Summer 1993.

James Crawford, California’s Proposition 227: A Post Mortem, Bilingual Research Journal v21, no1, pp1-30, June 1999.

Alexander Sapiens, Proposition 227: Politicizing Schooling for Latinos in California, Educational Horizons 77 no4 168-70 Summer 1000.

Catherine Cornbleth, Controling curriculum knowledge: multicultural politics and policy making, Journal of Curriculum studies v27 no2, pp 165-185 March/April 1995.

 

Robert E. Rossier, A Critique of California’s Evaluation of Propgrams for Students of Limited-English Proficiency, Read Perspectives v2, n1, pp27-51, Spring 1995

Lourdes Rovira, Lets not say adios to bilingual education, U.S. Catholic 63 no11 pp22-6 n 1998.

Catherine P. Johnson, The California Backlash Aginst Bilingual Education: Valeria G. vs Wilson and Proposition 227, University of San Francisco Law Revew 34 no1 169-95 Fall 1999.

Mathew Miller, Man with a mission, The New Republic 221 no3-4 Jl 19-26

Rosalie Pedalino Porter The Case Against Bilingual Education Atlantic Monthly, May 1998.

Peter Schrg Languge Barrier, The New Republic, v218 p14-15 March 9, 1998.

John J. Attinasi, English Only For Califonia Children and the Aftermather of Proposition 227, Education (Chula Vista, Calif.) 119 no2 263-83 Winter 1998.

Andrew Philips, Language Wars: Spanish speakers fight to overturn bilingual education, Maclean’s 111 no22 34 Je 1998.

California Department of Education, Educational Demographics Unit. (1998). Language census, 1997 (Online). Available: http://www.cde.ca.gav/ftpbranch/sbsdiv/demographics/reports/

California Secretary of State, Political Reform Divison. 1998. Financing California’s statewide ballot measures: Campaign receipts and expenditures through June 30, 1998 (Online). Available: http://www.ss.ca.gov/prd/bmprimary98 2/prop227-2.htm.

California Department of Finance, Demographic Research Unit. (1998) Race/ethic population estimates: Components of change by race for California counties and state (Online) Available: http://www.dof.ca.gov/html/Demograp/race-eth.htm.

Citizens for an Educated America (1989) Talking points against 227 (Online). Available: http://www.noonunz.org/points/points.html.

English for the Children. (1997). Proposition 227: The 1998 California English for the Children” initiative (Online). Available: http://www.onenation.org/index.html.

National Association for Bilingual Educaation (NABE) (1998). Democracy, Deception, and Denial: The 1998 California “English for the Children” Initiative (On;ine). Availabel: http://www.nabe.org/inz/2101xdir.html.

California Teachers of English to Speakersof Other Languages (CATESOL) Voices from the classroom, (March 1999) (Online). Available: http://www.catesol.org/voice.html.

Associate press Group Say Parents Intimidated When Seeking Bilingual Waivers, (Friday, October 16, 1998)Online). Available: http:www.humnet.ucla.edu/humnet/1…stics/people/gragds/macswan/AP22.htm.

 


 

[1] California Constitution, 1849 Article XI, Section21.

[2] Article III, Section 6, adopted Nov. 4, 1986.

[3] California Department of Education, Statewide data for the year 1998-99.

[4] California Department of Education, language Census, 1997.

[5] Time 151 no22 56 Jan. 1998.

[6] See www.onenation.org/maldefqa.html.

[7] Ron Unz, Chairman, English for the Children, Alice Callaghan, Director, Las Familias del Peeblo.

[8] John D’Amellio—President, California School Board Association.

[9] An archive of news overage on the English for the Children web site includes more than 600 articles, mostly from California print media; http://www.onenation .org/new.html.

[10] California Department of Education, 1997.

[11] Ron Unz, “California and the End of White America” Commentary 108 No4 17-28 N, 1999.

[12] For example, voters turned thumbs down on Proposition 226, which would limited unions’ ability to spend their members’ dues on political campaigns. In exit polls, 48 percent of voters identified themselves as Democrats and 20 percent as liberals, versus 40 percent and 17 percent, respectably, in the November 1994 election when Proposition 187 was adopted. (Los Angeles Times—CNN Poll, 1998.)

[13] The “black” xenophobia” Unz (1994) had warned about failed to materialize, as African-American voted against Proposition 227, 48 to 52 percent. Non-Hispanic whites voted in favor, 67 to 33 percent (Los Angeles Times-CNN Poll, 1998).

[14] Like most campaigns, Citizens was neither a formal coalition nor a membership organization; there was no structure for democratic decision-making or regular communication with volunteers. The No on 227 steering committee was beholden to its sponsoring groups, in particular those supplying the financial resources. Most day-today operations were delegated to Ritchie Ross, a Sacramento political consultant.

[15] Citizens for an Educated America, 1998b.

[16] Citizens for an Educated America raised and spent $4,754,157. English for the Children raised $1,289,815 but spent only $976,632. Ron Unz personally contributed $752,738 (California Secretary of State, 1998. See appendix.

[17] Ron Unz, California and the End of White America, Commentary 108 no4 17-28 n 1999.